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Ádám Bujdosó
Nicolaus ex Mirabilibus on Conscience
We have three works by Nicolaus ex Mirabilibus, Dominican friar of a presum-
able Italian origin, born in Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca), which survived to our 
day. The earliest was written in Florence, in early 1489. The basis for it was 
a preach by Nicolaus held in a Dominican female cloister named after martyr 
Saint Peter, about conscience. This preach was reworked and completed by the 
author; hence his first work known to us was born. His second work, a trac-
tate already written in Latin, recorded a disputation in Florence, primarily on 
the cause of evil, held in the cathedral of Sancta Reparata and in Lorenzo de’ 
Medici’s house, also in 1489. His third work – already written in the court of 
Vladislaus II of Hungary in 1493, also in Latin – was on predestination.1
In my paper, I am going to deal with the earliest work by Nicolaus, on con-
science, written in early 1489. The tractate was published by Jenő Ábel in 1886, 
under the title Libello de consciencia.2 It is known that both the Dominican 
school representing the intellectualist view and the Franciscan school repre-
senting the voluntarist view were present in Florence at the end of the 15th 
century. The names of the views originate from that for intellectualists it was 
reason (intellectus) that served as the main criterion of the freedom of choice, 
while for voluntarists it was will (voluntas). Nicolaus was a prominent repre-
sentative of Dominicans, while Georgius Benignus de Salviatis of South Slavic 
origin was a memorable Franciscan. Elsewhere I lined up arguments for that 
in his work about the cause of evil and in his work entitled Disputatio Nicolaus 
aims at following the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, and takes an intellectual-
ist standpoint, while his main opponent, Georgius follows John Duns Scotus, 
1 Ábel, J.: Nicolaus de Mirabilibus élete és munkái. [Life and Works of Nicolaus de Mirabilibus.] 
In Fraknói, V. – Ábel, J. (eds.): Két magyarországi egyházi író a XV. századból. Andreas 
Pannonius – Nicolaus de Mirabilibus. Irodalomtörténeti Emlékek. I. [Two Ecclesiastical Authors 
in Hungary from the Fifteenth Century. Andreas Pannonius – Nicolaus de Mirabilibus. Literary 
History Reminiscences. I. ] Budapest 1886, XXIII–XLVIII. XXV; XXVII; XXX–XXXII; 
XLIII.
2 Ábel (n. 1) 287–350.
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and takes a voluntarist view.3 A legitimate question is whether it is also true 
of Nicolaus’ work about conscience that its author is a follower of Thomas 
Aquinas, and an intellectualist.
First, let me outline, for the sake of intelligibility, the contents of the work. 
Nicolaus’ definition of conscience follows Origen and Thomas Aquinas. 
Conscience is the educator and supervisor of our soul, which starts out of 
a natural judgement of our souls, and urges us to be devoted to good and keep 
aloof from evil. Three factors play roles in the decision of conscience: first, the 
so-called synderesis,4 second: ratio superior or inferior, and third: conscientia, 
that is conscience itself.5 (Attention should be paid to the inconsistency of the 
term; that is, the word conscientia denotes conscience itself, the third element of 
the enumeration above, and also in general, the unity of the three factors!)
Following Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Nicolaus defines synderesis as 
an inclination innate in our souls, that drives us in all cases to seek good and 
to avoid evil.6
This is followed by the description of the two ratios. Ratio superior (ragione 
superiore) means the wisdom directed at unearthly matters. In Nicolaus’ opin-
ion, besides Christians, Jews are the ones who own this ability, as they are also 
owners of a part of the divine revelation. Besides them, pagan philosophers, 
poets and orators7 could also own ratio superior, inasmuch they were, during 
their observations, able to find the true God.
As opposed to ratio superior, ratio inferior (ragione inferiore) means the 
proficiency in earthly matters and sciences. This is indeed inferior to ratio 
superior, as the most one that can be reached by the observation of natural 
phenomena and by contemplating upon them is the idea of the one God.8
It is no surprise, therefore, that ratio inferior, according to Nicolaus, is fal-
lible, as it is only proficient in earthly prudence. However, ratio superior is 
3 Nicolaus ex Mirabilibus a rosszról. [Nicolaus ex Mirabilibus on Evil.] Lecture given at Pázmány 
Péter Catholic University, Budapest, 14 January 2014.
4 For the possible etymology of the word “synderesis” (συνείδησις or συντήρησις) see: Potts, 
T. C.: Conscience in Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge 1980, 10.
5 Ábel (n. 1) 293.
6 Ábel (n. 1) 294.
7 Mentioned by name: Hermes Trismegistus, Plato, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
Simplicius, Avicenna, Avempace, Averroes, Terence, Virgil, Ovid, Horace, and Cicero. Ábel 
(n. 1) 300.
8 Ábel (n. 1) 294–300.
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also fallible. Sensuality, as something created by God, entails great pleasure 
out of God’s will, and this can mislead ratio superior, which, being misled by 
sensuality, may believe that luxury is good, because it entails great pleasure 
out of God’s will. Or, in another example of Nicolaus, ratio superior is apt to 
believe that dwelling among sinners is good, as Christ also dwelt among them 
in order to engage in conversations with them.9
Finally, the task of conscientia, i.e. conscience in proper sense, is to make 
decisions above the proposals of synderesis and ratio superior or inferior. 
According to the etymology related to by Nicolaus, its name is conscientia 
exactly because it is what makes the decision: concludens scientia.10
The question can be raised: what do erroneous judgements and acts result 
from? Out of the three factors, synderesis is infallible, as what it does is no 
more than urging us to do good and avoid evil, and to obey God.
Neither is, according to Nicolaus, conscience fallible, as it cannot judge 
whether a deed is good or evil. Consequently, the expressions “wide”, “good” 
or “bad conscience” do not relate to conscientia itself, but to the judgement 
that arises from the co-operation between synderesis, either of the ratios, and 
conscientia.11
So if neither synderesis nor conscientia are fallible, then the sole cause of error 
can be within either of the ratios, which is fallible owing to either negligence, 
when it does not take the trouble to learn what it has to know (Nicolaus’ ex-
ample to this is the Jews’ belief of Messiah), or owing to the fact that it cannot 
control its passions as a result of the original sin.12
Following that, Nicolaus describes what the acts of conscience in its wider, 
general sense manifests itself in. First, it testifies all our good and evil deeds 
done in the past, and hence it can be the cause of our spiritual joy or pain 
over them. Second, it accuses us in the present when we are about to commit 
an evil act. Third, it warns and urges us to do or not to do something in the 
future.13
The author states at the end of his tractate that we have to obey the word 
of conscience at all times, even if it is false (erronea) due to our ignorance, 
negligence, excessive self-love or conceit, and similarly, if it is scrupulous 
9 Ábel (n. 1) 311.
10 Ábel (n. 1) 312–314.
11 Ábel (n. 1) 314–315.
12 Ábel (n. 1) 318–320.
13 Ábel (n. 1) 330–335.
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(scrupulosa) as being built upon unfounded assumptions. Quite unsurpris-
ingly, if we remember that this tractate is a reworked and completed version of 
a preach, Nicolaus’ answer to the question as to how we can avoid erroneous 
or scrupulous conscience is: keep to the teachings of the Scriptures, ask for 
the help of the wisdom of God in our prayers, humble our proud hearts, live 
a wise life without tormenting ourselves beyond the necessary extent, follow 
the advice of confessors, preachers and wise persons, and — last but not least 
— submit ourselves to the mercy of God.14
I.
After getting acquainted with Nicolaus’ thoughts, we seek answer to the ques-
tion that to what extent Nicolaus follows Thomas Aquinas’ views.
According to Aquinas, similarly to how theoretical15 reason must rely on prin-
ciples that are known through themselves (per se nota, like the principle of 
non-contradiction), so must exist such principles available for the practical 
reason regarding human deeds.16 That is, the whole establishment of knowledge 
must rely upon necessarily true principles, as, if we could be mistaken in these 
principles, then nothing could be asserted for sure from that on.17 For the prac-
tical reason, these true principles in moral matters are served by synderesis.18 
Unlike Albert the Great, who attributed special content to them (“adultery is 
forbidden”, “killing is forbidden”, “compassion must be felt for those suffering”),19 
Thomas Aquinas thinks that the principles of synderesis are the simplest and 
most general ones: “avoid evil”, “do nothing that is forbidden”, “obey God”, “live 
correspondingly to reason”.20 Every person knows these principles from the 
beginning, and accesses them whenever needed. Due to its nature, synderesis 
is infallible, and it only shows that one must seek good and avoid evil.21
14 Ábel (n. 1) 339–350.
15 Nicolaus uses the word speculativo.
16 Hoffmann, T.: Conscience and Synderesis. In Davies, B. – Stump, E. (eds.): The Oxford 
Handbook of Aquinas. Oxford 2012, 255–264, see 256.
17 Aquinas, Quaest. de veritate q.16, a.2, co. All the works of Thomas Aquinas are available here: 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html.
18 Aquinas, Super Sent. II d.24, q.2, a.3, co.; Quaest. de veritate q.16, a.1, ad 9.
19 Cited by Hoffmann (n. 16) 263, note 9.
20 Aquinas, Super Sent. II d.24, q.2, a.3, co. and d.39, q.3, a.2, co.; Quaest. de veritate q.16, a.1, ad 9.
21 Potts, T. C.: Conscience. In Kretzmann, N. – Kenny, A. – Pinborg, J. (eds.): The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge 1982, 687–704, see 701; Hoffmann (n. 16) 
256–257.
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Synderesis is, therefore, a natural disposition of the human reason; it is infal-
lible, and it exists in order to make the most elementary principles of moral 
action accessible to us.
Conscience applies these elementary principles of synderesis in the particular 
moral situations. However, conscience also needs further, secondary principles, 
which one can become in possession of by exercising and learning the virtue 
of wisdom. Therefore, conscience applies the principles of synderesis and the 
secondary principles learned by the practice of wisdom, which means that 
conscience is the application of our moral knowledge in a given situation.22 
The structure of making a moral decision is described by a syllogism: its major 
premise is the infallible word of synderesis, its minor premise is the practical 
reason, while the conclusion is the decision of the conscience. If the practical 
reason is in accordance with the divine wisdom, it can be regarded as ratio 
superior; if, however, it is characterised by earthly prudence, then it is only 
ratio inferior,23 as seen at Nicolaus. The key to a morally right decision is that 
ratio should provide a correct minor premise to the syllogism.24
Based on the above, we see that the opinions of Nicolaus and Thomas corre-
spond to each other. Still, let’s have a look at what happens when the conscience 
makes an erroneous decision. We have seen at Nicolaus that one must always 
obey the decision of conscience, even if it is erroneous or over-scrupulous. 
Thomas Aquinas represents a seemingly paradox standpoint regarding obedi-
ence to conscience. He argues that I should never act against my conscience, 
stating, at the same time, that I do not always have to obey it.25 How to resolve 
this contradiction? According to Aquinas, it is negligence not to realise that 
a decision of my conscience and moral laws conflict. This lapse of conscience, 
that is, could have been avoided if more attention was paid to my moral de-
velopment. However, the possibility to abandon this negligence and to raise 
doubts against the decision of my conscience is given to me in every moment. 
And if there are doubts as for the erroneous decision — making it a doubtful 
decision —, then I am in the position of being able to revise (deponere) the 
decision of my conscience.26 Similarly, I can also improve my conscience by 
22 Aquinas, ST I–II q.19, a.5, s.c. and co.; Quaest. de veritate q.17, a.2, co.
23 Aquinas, Quaest. de veritate q.15, a.2.
24 Hoffmann (n. 16) 257–258. E.g. in Aquinas, ST I–II q.19; Quaest. de veritate q.17, a.2, co.
25 Hoffmann (n. 16) 261.
26 Aquinas, Super Sent. II d.39, q.3, a.3, ad 5; Quodl. III q.12, a.2, ad 2; ST I–II q.19, a.6, ad 3.
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means of moral development in the practice of the virtues.27 Thomas, therefore, 
states, that one must not obey the decision of the erroneous conscience, but it 
must rather be revised, and the decision of the revised conscience must be ac-
complished, in which way it will become true that neither have I acted against 
it, nor have I obeyed it, as I have revised its decision when it was erroneous.
So we can see that Nicolaus highly relies on the teachings of Aquinas in the mat-
ter of conscience, but he diverts from them in an important point, as he, on the 
contrary to Aquinas, states that one must always obey the voice of conscience.
II.
Second, we seek for an answer to the question whether or not Nicolaus’ stand-
point is intellectualist, and whether, in this regard, he is a follower of Aquinas.
Aquinas strongly emphasizes the dependence of will on reason. In Summa 
Theologiae he writes:
The root of freedom is the will as its subject, but reason as its cause. The will 
is, in fact, free with regard to alternatives, because reason can have differ-
ent conceptions of the good. Accordingly, the philosophers defined free 
decision (liberum arbitrium) as free judgment owing to reason (liberum 
de ratione iudicium), implying that reason is the cause of freedom.28
For Aquinas, will is a moved mover, a passive potency, which is actualised 
by the object which the reason presents to it. The specific object of will is the 
good that it perceives to be suitable and adequate. This is why one can long 
for a given object as good, regardless whether or not it is in fact good, merely 
because reason has presented it to him as an object appearing to be good (sub 
ratione boni).29 Resulting from this, will is unable to long for or decide upon 
anything else other than what reason has presented to it as the best and the 
most suitable.30 Therefore, will is able to act freely, inasmuch reason is able 
27 Hoffmann (n. 16) 261.
28 Aquinas, ST I–II q.17, a.1, ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut 
subiectum, sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia 
ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium 
quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.” Quoted and translated by 
Hoffmann, T.: Intellectualism and Voluntarism. In Pasnau, R. (ed.): The Cambridge History 
of Medieval Philosophy. I. Cambridge 2010, 414–427, see 415.
29 Aquinas, ST I–II q.8, a.1; q.9, a.12; Quaest. de malo q.6, ad 6.
30 Aquinas, ST I–II q.77, a.1, co. and III q.18, a.4, ad 2.
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to make judgements freely. If will acts erroneously, the error must lie within 
knowledge or judgement.
Based on the above, we should consider Thomas intellectualist, and he is 
usually classified this way.
As opposed to him, John Duns Scotus is a typical representative of the vol-
untarist view, who focuses on will instead of reason in his system of thought. 
In his opinion, will is different from anything else in this world. That is, it is 
only will that is able to drive itself towards opposite acts: it can will or not will 
something.31 Will is primarily characterised by its ability to control itself, con-
trary to reason, which is unable to have control over itself. That is, reason lacks 
the power to understand or not to understand. Moreover, according to Duns 
Scotus, if, following Aristotle, we consider rational that which has the power 
to cause opposite effects, and consider irrational that which is determined to 
cause a specific effect32, then will must be considered a rational power, as it 
has the freedom to decide in alternative ways, and so we must consider reason 
irrational.33 Undoubtedly, Duns Scotus’ standpoint is a voluntarist one.
Back to Aquinas; he says more than what is usually attributed to him, and 
what we have set forth above. He writes that the free judgement of the reason 
and the free inclination of the will are mutually dependent on each other: 
reason moves will and will moves reason, even though not in the same respect. 
Reason determines and specifies the act of the will (e.g. that it should long 
for learning, or should choose walking). However, reason does not necessar-
ily move will – apart from one case, when it presents a thing to the reason as 
something good and suitable in every aspect, like happiness. Similarly, will 
also moves reason so that it can exert its own acts (that is, for instance, that it 
thinks or not, or that lingers over a notion or not). Moreover, not only does 
will initiate thinking, but it also controls and governs the whole process of 
thinking. Whether will makes a definitive or provisonal judgement is also 
dependent on will, as will may insist on the judgement of reason, but it may 
also urge reason to revise the judgement.34
What we see here is that Aquinas distinguishes the act of reason and that of 
the will with regards to free decision, however, he does not make a harsh dif-
ferentiation. The contribution of reason is necessary for every act of the will, 
31 Ioh. Duns Scotus, Lect. II, 25.92 and 93.
32 Arist. Metaph. IX,2 (1046b).
33 Hoffmann (n. 28) 424; Ioh. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. IX, 15.21–22 and 35–41.
34 Cf.: Aquinas, Quaest. de malo q.6, ad 15.
158 Ádám Bujdosó
while the process of the use of reason is controlled and governed by will. 
The acts of reason and will permeate each other, and it is ultimately man 
himself, the person, that moves himself by means of his reason and will.35 As, 
in this respect, the acts of the reason and will are mingled, Thomas Aquinas’ 
thought cannot simply be categorised as intellectualist36, even though it is 
close to it.
We can state about Nicolaus’ intellectualism that, in his work Disputatio, he 
represents, as far as I can see, an intellectualist standpoint. In his tractate on 
conscience he places a strong emphasis on reason, as it is responsible for the 
acts morally assessable, however, he does not go into details about the role 
of the will: he only says that we have to put it away.37 We must, on the basis of 
this, assume that he takes an intellectualist standpoint.
Finally, we can state that Nicolaus ex Mirabilibus is significantly a follower of 
the teachings of Thomas Aquinas in his work on conscience, however, at one 
point – in the question of obedience to the erroneous conscience – he diverts 
from him. Besides that, Nicolaus can be considered intellectualist – based on 
his two works written in Florence –, on the contrary to Aquinas, who, being 
undoubtedly close to the thought of the intellectualists, cannot simply be 
classified as intellectualist.
35 E.g.: ST I q.82, a.4, ad 1 and I–II q.17, a.1, co. and I–II q.17, a.5, ad 2.
36 Hoffmann (n. 28) 415–417.
37 Ábel (n. 1) 312: „Leva via la propria volonta.”
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